P4P, Reputation and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision

We investigate the effect of reputational motivation on output in a scenario of overprovision of medical treatment. We assume that physicians differ in their degree of altruism, enjoy being perceived as good but dislike being perceived as greedy. We show that better reputational motivation unambiguously reduces the costs of healthcare provision and the magnitude of overprovision which in turn rises patient benefits.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Kairies, Nadja
Publisher:	Essen : Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Subject:	Altruism \| performance \| motivation

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Series:	Ruhr Economic Papers ; 331
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
ISBN:	978-3-86788-380-1
Other identifiers:	10.4419/86788380 [DOI] 722247583 [GVK] hdl:10419/61461 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:rwirep:331 [RePEc]
Classification:	D64 - Altruism ; I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets ; I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287369