Pandering politicians? : targeted economic development incentives and voter response
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bundrick, Jacob ; Smith, Erica ; Yuan, Weici |
Published in: |
Public finance review : PFR. - Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage, ISSN 1552-7530, ZDB-ID 2070401-X. - Vol. 49.2021, 5, p. 673-716
|
Subject: | Economic development incentives | gubernatorial elections | strategic resource allocation | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Wahl | Election | Politiker | Politicians | Wirtschaftsförderung | Regional business growth programme | Regionalpolitik | Regional policy | Anreiz | Incentives |
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