Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model
Pareto dominated agreements are shown to prevail with positive probability in an open set of status quo in a Markov perfect equilibrium of a one-dimensional dynamic bargaining game with endogeneous status-quo. This equilibrium is continuous, symmetric, with dynamic preerences that satisfy the single-plateau proerty. It is also shown that there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium with single-peaked preferences.
Year of publication: |
2014-08
|
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Authors: | Kalandrakis, Tasos |
Institutions: | University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy |
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