Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions
By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, the authors introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, they show that the partial compliance of the target country, along with mild sanctions, are not only an equilibrium outcome, but also Pareto superior to non-compliance and tough economic sanctions. Copyright © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Beladi, Hamid ; Oladi, Reza |
Published in: |
Review of Development Economics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 13.2009, 1, p. 125-133
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
freely available
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