Partial Delegation in a Model of Currency Crisis
Stressing the inßuence of expected devaluation on currency crises, this paper shows that, in a fixed exchange-rate system with an escape clause, partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to an inßation-averse central banker reduces the probability of crisis.
Year of publication: |
2002-03
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Authors: | Boinet, Virginie |
Institutions: | Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University |
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