Partial exposure in large games
In this work we introduce the notion of partial exposure, in which the players of a simultaneous-move Bayesian game are exposed to the realized types and chosen actions of a subset of the other players. We show that in any large simultaneous-move game, each player has very little regret even after being partially exposed to other players. If players are given the opportunity to be exposed to others at the expense of a small decrease in utility, players will decline this opportunity, and the original Nash equilibria of the game will survive.
Year of publication: |
2010
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---|---|
Authors: | Gradwohl, Ronen ; Reingold, Omer |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 68.2010, 2, p. 602-613
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Noncooperative games Large games Nash equilibrium Ex post Nash |
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