Partial Passive Ownership Holdings, Licensing and Taxation

We consider a homogenous good Cournot duopoly, in which a firm owns acost-reducing technology and has a non-controlling share over its rival. Weshow that partial passive ownership holdings may induce licensing via afixed fee and increase consumer surplus, tax revenues, and social welfare.Moreover, a decrease in the ad valorem tax may also facilitate licensing andincrease welfare

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Leonardos, Stefanos ; Petrakis, Emmanuel ; Skartados, Panagiotis ; Stamatopoulos, Giorgos
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Lizenz \| Licence \| Eigentümerstruktur \| Ownership structure \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (13 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 18, 2021 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3807133 [DOI]
Classification:	L10 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. General ; L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013238831