Partially binding platforms : campaign promises vis-à-vis cost of betrayal
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Asako, Yasushi |
Published in: |
The Japanese economic review : the journal of the Japanese Economic Association. - Richmond, Vic. : Wiley, ISSN 1352-4739, ZDB-ID 1335724-4. - Vol. 66.2015, 3, p. 322-353
|
Subject: | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Wahlkampf | Electoral campaign | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
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