Partially Binding Platforms: Political Promises as a Partial Commitment Device
Year of publication: |
2010-02
|
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Authors: | Asako, Yasushi |
Institutions: | Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan |
Subject: | Electoral Competition | Median-voter Theorem | Valence | Campaign Platforms |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 10-E-01 |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
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