Parties As Political Intermediaries
This paper argues that parties regulate competition among like-minded factions so as to enhance reputation building by, and voter trust in, the politicians standing for a given cause. While intra- and interparty competition contributes to keeping politicians on their toes, unbridled competition may encourage politicians to challenge good platforms and to wage competition along socially suboptimal dimensions (for example, by privileging form over content). The paper builds a simple model of intraparty competition and studies whether various hierarchical or democratic party institutions constitute an efficient form of party governance. The paper shows that intraparty disagreements, when they occur, hurt the party's position in the general election, but that their possibility enhances party image; and that parties must be able to avoid behind-the-scene allocations of portfolios and spoils in order to be credible. Last, it analyzes the impact of political polarization and interparty competition on the choice of party governance. © 2001 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Caillaud, Bernard ; Tirole, Jean |
Published in: |
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. - MIT Press. - Vol. 117.2002, 4, p. 1453-1489
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Publisher: |
MIT Press |
Saved in:
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