Patent Breadth in an International Setting

We examine the Nash equilibria of a game where two national governments set patent breadth strategically. Broader patents make R&D more attractive, but the effect on static efficiency is nonmonotonic. In a North.South model, where only the North can innovate, harmonization of patent breadth lowers welfare relative to the Nash equilibrium. When both countries can innovate, harmonization toward narrower patent breadth may raise world welfare.

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Bond, Eric ; Zissimos, Benjamin
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	coordination \| innovation \| patent breadth \| patent race \| R&D

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 6411
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	884877809 [GVK] hdl:10419/161850 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_6411 [RePEc]
Classification:	F02 - International Economic Order; Economic Integration and Globalization: General ; F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations ; O30 - Technological Change; Research and Development. General ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011657132