Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting

We present a model of industry standard setting with two-sided asymmetric information about the existence of intellectual property. We provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) firms' incentives to communicate ideas for improvements of an industry standard, and (b) firms' decisions to disclose the existence of intellectual property to other participants of the standardization process

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Ganglmair, Bernhard
Other Persons:	Tarantino, Emanuele (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Patentrecht \| Patent law \| Standardisierung \| Standardization \| Immaterialgüterrechte \| Intellectual property rights \| Theorie \| Theory \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Unternehmenspolitik \| Corporate policy \| Patent

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (48 p)
Series:	NET Institute Working Paper ; No. 11-15
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 2011 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1957991 [DOI]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; O34 - Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067148