Patent protection with a cooperative R&D option

Patent protection may decrease R&D incentives due to the tournament effect. In this paper, we show that patent protection in the presence of a cooperative R&D option always increases the R&D incentive. In addition, this option dominates imitation to increase the R&D incentive under patent protection, and may also dominate royalty licensing depending on the R&D cost.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Che, XiaoGang ; Yang, Yibai
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 116.2012, 3, p. 469-471
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Cooperative R&D \| Patent protection \| R&D incentives

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; O34 - Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues ; O38 - Government Policy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594089