Pay-performance sensitivity of compensation contracts for nonexecutive employees : the case of the financial crisis
Year of publication: |
2015
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Authors: | Kampkötter, Patrick |
Published in: |
Applied economics letters. - Abingdon : Routledge, ISSN 1350-4851, ZDB-ID 1181036-1. - Vol. 22.2015, 7/9, p. 734-738
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Subject: | pay-performance sensitivity | pay for performance | bonus payments | financial industry | nonexecutive employees | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Finanzkrise | Financial crisis | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Finanzsektor | Financial sector | Arbeitskräfte | Workforce | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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