Paying not to sell

In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Bacchiega, Emanuele ; Bonroy, Olivier ; Mabrouk, Rania
Publisher:	Bologna : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

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Series:	Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; 870
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3893 [DOI] 898803977 [GVK] hdl:10419/159709 [Handle] RePEc:bol:bodewp:WP870 [RePEc]
Classification:	L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011651762