Payoff-dependent mistakes and q-resistant equilibrium
This paper proposes an extension of p-dominance called q-resistant equilibrium, which has the largest resistance to payoff-dependent mistakes. The selection could differ from the risk-dominant equilibrium, and a sufficient condition for a q-resistant equilibrium to follow risk-dominance is provided.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Yi, Kang-Oh |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 102.2009, 2, p. 99-101
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Payoff-dependent mistakes Equilibrium selection |
Saved in:
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