Payoffs in Non-Differentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies

We show that a single-valued solution of non-atomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underlying them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection).

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Haimanko, Ori
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 28.2001, 8, p. 0-0
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008563147