Peer Choice in CEO Compensation

Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self-serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent. We test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer selection into talent and self-serving components. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the association between a firm's selection of highly paid peers and CEO pay mostly represents compensation for CEO talent

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Albuquerque, Ana M.
Other Persons:	De Franco, Gus (contributor) ; Verdi, Rodrigo S. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation \| Vergütungssystem \| Compensation system \| Soziale Gruppe \| Social group \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Lohn \| Wages
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Check Google Scholar |

More access options

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 13, 2012 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100759