Perfect Bayesian implementation when the planner is a player
The paper contributes to the perfect Bayesian implementation problem when the planner selects an outcome after agents send a signal profile. In our problem, the planner always selects the outcomes that maximize her expected utility, given her posterior belief about the state. The paper explicitly models the problem and shows a full characterization of SCF set that can be perfect Bayesian implemented in FGP equilibrium.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Liu, Changchen ; Luo, Yunfeng |
Published in: |
Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 46.2010, 4, p. 400-404
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Social choice function Perfect Bayesian implementation FGP equilibrium Bayesian reliable objection |
Saved in:
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