Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This concept is a refinement of Myerson's [Myerson, R.B., 1982. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal agent problems, J. Math. Econ. 10, 67-81] communication equilibrium. A communication equilibrium is perfect if it induces a communication equilibrium of the continuation game, after every history of messages of the mediator. We provide a characterization of the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs and derive a Folk Theorem for discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Tomala, Tristan |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 67.2009, 2, p. 682-694
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Repeated games Imperfect monitoring Communication equilibria |
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