Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Tomala, Tristan |
Institutions: | Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) |
Subject: | Repeated games | Imperfect monitoring | Communication equilibria |
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