Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

We obtain conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game with infinitely many types and/or strategies that ensure the existence of a perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The main existence results are illustrated in the context of all-pay auctions.

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Year of publication:	20 Feb 2017
Authors:	Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
Publisher:	New Brunswick, NJ : Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Subject:	infinite game of incomplete information \| perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium \| payoff security \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten)
Series:	Working papers / Rutgers University, Department of Economics. - New Brunswick, NJ : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2172035-6. - Vol. 201703
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/162936 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011614248