Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient

The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to one is characterized, with examples, even when the full-dimensionality condition fails.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Fudenberg, Drew ; Levine, David K. ; Takahashi, Satoru
Institutions:	Harvard Institute of Economic Research (HIER), Department of Economics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2051
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005633777