Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient
| Year of publication: |
2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew ; Levine, David K. ; Takahashi, Satoru |
| Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
| Subject: | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Theorie | Theory |
| Description of contents: |
The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to one is characterized, with examples, even when the full-dimensionality condition fails
|
freely available
| Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (15 p) |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 2004 erstellt |
| Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.619283 [DOI] |
| Classification: | x15 ; x16 |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068528