Performance Measure Aggregation, Career Incentives, and Explicit Incentives
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Autrey, Romana L. ; Dikolli, Shane S. ; Newman, Paul |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Monte-Carlo-Simulation | Monte Carlo simulation | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Arbeitsleistung | Job performance |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Journal of Management Accounting Research Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 1, 2009 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Classification: | J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; M41 - Accounting |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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