Permis de pollution et oligopole asymétrique
[fre] Nous montrons que quand des firmes polluantes sont des concurrents à la Cournot, elles peuvent avoir une incitation à utiliser des permis de pollution comme moyen indirect de coordonner leur production. Si les firmes sont initialement identiques, les échanges de permis peuvent conduire à un oligopole asymétrique. Le cas de firmes initialement asymétriques est aussi considéré. [eng] Emissions Trading and Asymmetric Oligopoly by Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran . We show that when polluting firms are Cournot competitors, they may have an incentive to use emissions trading to indirectly co-ordinate their production. If the firms are initially identical, emissions trading can create an asymmetric oligopoly. The case of initially asymmetric firms is also considered.
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Soubeyran, Antoine ; Long, Ngo Van |
Published in: |
Économie et Prévision. - Programme National Persée, ISSN 0249-4744. - Vol. 143.2000, 2, p. 83-89
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Publisher: |
Programme National Persée |
Saved in:
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