Persistent distortionary policies with asymmetric information
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mitchell, Matthew F. ; Moro, Andrea |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 96.2006, 1, p. 387-393
|
Subject: | Staatliche Einflussnahme | State intervention | Sachenrecht | Law of property | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory |
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