Persuasion and dynamic communication
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Sher, Itai |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 9.2014, 1, p. 99-136
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | Communication | optimal persuasion rules | credibility | commitment | evidence | maximum flow problem |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE683 [DOI] 893949590 [GVK] hdl:10419/150215 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:683 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge |
Source: |
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Persuasion and dynamic communication
Sher, Itai, (2014)
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Persuasion and Limited Communication
Sher, Itai, (2008)
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Persuasion and dynamic communication
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Price discrimination through communication
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