Physician Market Power--Evidence from the Allocation of Malpractice Premiums.
Based on evidence from variations in malpractice premiums, physicians have local market power, at least in some dimensions. It is observed that higher-cost physicians pass on a significant portion of idiosyncratic costs to patients as higher prices. I test two hypothesized sources of this market power: barriers to entry from specialization and relatively inelastic firm-level demand for certain services. Examining the relationship of physician-specific malpractice premiums to fees, I find no observable difference in the ability of surgeons and nonsurgeons to pass on these costs; however, both types of physicians pass them on more to surgical than to nonsurgical patients. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Thurston, Norman K |
Published in: |
Economic Inquiry. - Western Economic Association International - WEAI. - Vol. 39.2001, 3, p. 487-98
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Publisher: |
Western Economic Association International - WEAI |
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