Platform strategy of video game software in Japan, 1984–1994: theory and evidence
This paper analyzes a model of platform competition in markets of system products composed of hardware and complementary software, with a specific focus on exclusive contracting. When hardware products are strongly differentiated, or when consumers value the marginal benefit of additional software variety highly, we find that, in equilibrium, hardware firms will engage in exclusive contracting of software development. This finding is strongly supported by our empirical results in the Japanese home video game industry, dominated by Nintendo from 1984 to 1994. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Maruyama, Masayoshi ; Ohkita, Kenichi |
Published in: |
Managerial and Decision Economics. - John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., ISSN 0143-6570. - Vol. 32.2011, 2, p. 105-118
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Publisher: |
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
Saved in:
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