Please, marry me!: An experimental study of risking a joint venture
Empirical studies in family economics usually rely on questionnaires, statistical or panel data. Here we try to study experimentally some crucial aspects of engaging in a marriage. First the female partner can end the relationship or suggest one of the two forms of joint venture. Whereas a full engagement relies on more specialization, but makes her more exploitable by the male partner, a low engagement is less productive, but also fairer. More specifically, the random profit of a joint venture is allocated by ultimatum bargaining in case of a full engagement whereas demands are determined simultaneously in case of a low engagement. Partners interact anonymously. In the repetition the two partners in a matching group of four participants are exchanged. Our treatment variables are her and his outside option value representing gender specific investments in human capital.
Year of publication: |
1999
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Authors: | Güth, Werner ; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta ; Tjotta, Sigve |
Publisher: |
Berlin : Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; 1999,92 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 722912900 [GVK] hdl:10419/61707 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199992 [RePEc] |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010309984
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