Political agency, oversight, and bias : the instrumental value of politicized policymaking
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Turner, Ian R. |
Published in: |
The journal of law, economics, and organization. - Cary, NC : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 1465-7341, ZDB-ID 1501039-9. - Vol. 35.2019, 3, p. 544-578
|
Subject: | Politikwissenschaft | Political science | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Produktionskapazität | Production capacity | Investition | Investment | Projektbewertung | Project evaluation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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