Political Business Cycles through Lobbying
In this paper we build a framework where the interplay between the lobby power of special interest groups and the voting power of the majority of the population leads to political business cycles. We apply our set up to explain electoral cycles in government expenditure composition as well as to cycles in aggregate expenditures and in real exchange rates.
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bonomo, Marco ; Terra, Cristina |
Institutions: | Théorie Économique, Modélisation, Application (THEMA), Université de Cergy-Pontoise |
Saved in:
freely available
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