Political competition between differentiated candidates

We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidatesʼ immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) as well as their policy positions, which are flexible. Candidates are uncertain about the distribution of voter preferences and choose policy positions to maximize their winning probability.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Krasa, Stefan ; Polborn, Mattias K.
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 76.2012, 1, p. 249-271
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Multidimensional policy \| Voting \| Political competition

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049805