Political compromise and bureaucratic structure : the political origins of the Federal Reserve System
Gyung-Ho Jeong; Gary J. Miller; Andrew C. Sobel
| Year of publication: |
2009
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Jeong, Gyung-ho ; Miller, Gary J. ; Sobel, Andrew Carl |
| Published in: |
The journal of law, economics, & organization. - Cary, NC [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 8756-6222, ZDB-ID 634985-7. - Vol. 25.2009, 2, p. 472-498
|
| Subject: | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Politik | Politics | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Bürokratietheorie | Theory of bureaucracy | USA | United States |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892091