Political stabilization by an independent regulator
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Faure-Grimaud, Antoine ; Martimort, David |
Published in: |
The political economy of antitrust. - Amsterdam : Elsevier Science, ISBN 978-0-444-53093-6. - 2007, p. 383-415
|
Subject: | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Regulierung | Regulation | Bürokratie | Bureaucracy | Aufsichtsbehörde | Regulatory agency | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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