Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation
Year of publication: |
July 2015
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Authors: | Epstein, Gil S. ; Mealem, Yosef |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0040-5833, ZDB-ID 189247-2. - Vol. 79.2015, 1, p. 133-149
|
Subject: | Rent dissipation | Central planner | Contest | All-pay auction | Generalized logit contest success function | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods |
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Politicians, governed vs. non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation
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