Politicians, interest groups, and regulators : a multiple-principals agency theory of regulation, or "let them be bribed"
Year of publication: |
1990
|
---|---|
Authors: | Spiller, Pablo T. |
Published in: |
The journal of law & economics. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. of Chicago Press, ISSN 0022-2186, ZDB-ID 218304-3. - Vol. 33.1990, 1, p. 65-101
|
Subject: | Regulierung | Regulation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory | USA | United States | Parlament | Parliament | 1932-1984 |
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