Politics and the Labor Market: The Role of Frictions
We study how political intermediation in the labor market interacts with search frictions. Politicians create and control (to a certain extent) business opportunities for firms, hence the creation of new vacancies. But to compete for these vacancies workers have to give their support to politicians. This leads to a fragmentation of the labor market, where politicians act as mediators between demand and supply. We show that in presence of information asymmetries (when non-aliated workers are not able to distinguish non-aliated firms, for which they are eligible, from aliated ones, for which they are not eligible) the impact of political intermediation is U-shaped, and can more than double the resulting unemployment rate.
Year of publication: |
2006
|
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Authors: | Bonaventura, Luigi ; Consoli, Andrea ; Richiardi, Matteo ; Spagano, Salvo |
Institutions: | Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino |
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