Pooling, Access, and Countervailing Power in Channel Governance
Year of publication: |
2011-03-24
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Authors: | Hendrikse, G.W.J. |
Institutions: | Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam. |
Subject: | channel governance | cooperatives | pooling | foreclosure | market power | incomplete contracts |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | Research Paper. - ISSN 1566-5283. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series RePEc:dgr:eureri Number ERS-2011-009-ORG |
Source: |
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Pooling, Access, and Countervailing Power in Channel Governance
Hendrikse, George, (2011)
-
Pooling, Access, and Countervailing Power in Channel Governance
Hendrikse, Hendrikse, G.W.J., (2011)
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Exclusive Contracts, Loss to Delay and Incentives to Invest
Groh, Christian, (2004)
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Marketing Cooperatives and Financial Structure
Hendrikse, G.W.J., (2000)
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Co-operatives in chains: institutional restructuring in the Dutch fruit and vegetables industry
Bijman, W.J.J., (2003)
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A marketing co-operative as a system of attributes
Bijman, W.J.J., (2000)
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