Positive feedback in coordination games : stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hwang, Sung-Ha ; Rey-Bellet, Luc |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 126.2021, p. 355-373
|
Subject: | Evolutionary games | Exit problems | Logit choice rules | Marginal bandwagon property | Nash bargaining solution | Nash demand games | Positive feedback | Stochastic stability | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | Evolutionary game theory | Begrenzte Rationalität | Bounded rationality |
-
Learning to coordinate : co-evolution and correlated equilibrium
Lee-Penagos, Alejandro, (2016)
-
Repeated play of families of games by resource-constrained players
Nikandrova, Arina, (2013)
-
Implementation, elimination of weakly dominated strategies and evolutionary dynamics
Cabrales, Antonio, (2000)
- More ...
-
Deterministic equations for stochastic spatial evolutionary games
Hwang, Sung-Ha, (2013)
-
Deterministic Equations for Stochastic Spatial Evolutionary Games
Hwang, Sung-Ha, (2010)
-
Decompositions of two player games: potential, zero-sum, and stable games
Hwang, Sung-Ha, (2011)
- More ...