Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from Experimental Auctions
In most experimental auctions, researchers ask participants to bid on the same item in multiple potentially binding rounds, posting the price submitted by the top bidder or bidders after each of those rounds. If bids submitted in later rounds are affiliated with posted prices from earlier rounds, this practice could result in biased value estimates. In this article, we discuss the results of an experiment designed explicitly to test whether posted prices affect bidding behavior. We find that for familiar items, high posted prices lead to increased bids in subsequent rounds. Our results have implications for researchers conducting experimental auctions. Copyright 2006 American Agricultural Economics Association.
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Corrigan, Jay R. ; Rousu, Matthew C. |
Published in: |
American Journal of Agricultural Economics. - American Agricultural Economics Association. - Vol. 88.2006, 4, p. 1078-1090
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Publisher: |
American Agricultural Economics Association |
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