Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation
Year of publication: |
2004
|
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Authors: | Garratt, Rod ; Qin, Cheng-Zhong ; Parco, James E. ; Rapoport, Amnon |
Publisher: |
Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |
Subject: | Regierungskoalition | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Test | Regierungswechsel | Coalition formation | Potential maximization | Nash equilibrium refinements | Experimental study | Minimal winning |
Series: | Nota di Lavoro ; 82.2004 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/117958 [Handle] RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.82 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
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Potential maximization and coalition government formation
Garratt, Rod, (2004)
-
POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION
GARRATT, ROD, (2005)
-
Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation
Garratt, Rod, (2004)
- More ...
-
POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION
GARRATT, ROD, (2005)
-
Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation
Garratt, Rod, (2004)
-
Potential maximization and coalition government formation
Garratt, Rod, (2004)
- More ...