Power indices and minimal winning coalitions
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Kirsch, Werner ; Langner, Jessica |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 34.2010, 1, p. 33-46
|
Subject: | Penrose-Banzhaf-Index | Abstimmungsspiel | Voting game | Macht | Power | Koalition | Coalition | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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