Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Kóczy, László Á. |
Published in: |
Homo oeconomicus : HOE ; journal of behavioral and institutional economics. - Cham, Switzerland : Springer International Publishing, ISSN 2366-6161, ZDB-ID 2130765-9. - Vol. 33.2016, 1/2, p. 77-91
|
Subject: | Quarrelling | Rejected coalitions | A priori voting power | Power indices | Minimal winning coalitions | Rational players | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Koalition | Coalition | Macht | Power | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Abstimmungsspiel | Voting game |
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