Power to youth: Designing democracy for long-term well-being
Democratic processes may not take the welfare of future generations sufficiently into account and thus may not achieve sustainability. We introduce rejection/support rewards (RSRs) and show that a dual democratic mechanism-RSRs and elections-can achieve sustainability. RSRs stipulate that incumbents who are not re-elected, but obtain the majority support among young voters, receive a particular monetary or non-monetary reward. Such rejection/support rewards induce politicians to undertake long-term beneficial policies, but may invite excessive reward-seeking. We identify optimal RSRs under different informational circumstances.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Gersbach, Hans ; Kleinschmidt, Tobias |
Published in: |
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 58.2009, 2, p. 158-172
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Democracy Elections Incentive contracts Sustainability Rejection/support rewards |
Saved in:
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