Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Andonie, Costel ; Kuzmics, Christoph |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 84.2012, 2, p. 681-700
|
Subject: | Symmetry | Focal points | Voting | Duverger's law | Condorcet loser | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Wahl | Election | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Abstimmung |
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