Precaution, ICES and the common fisheries policy: a study of regime interplay
This article examines the interplay between the precautionary provisions in the global fisheries regime and problem-solving under (1) the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea and (2) the EU Common Fisheries Policy. The causal processes are partly ideational (learning-driven) and partly normative (commitments-driven). The effect is synergistic: the UN Fish Stocks Agreement strengthened the hand of those within ICES and EU fisheries bodies who favoured greater safety margins, long-term planning and pre-agreement on recovery plans for endangered stocks--without disrupting cooperative relations. There is some awareness among participants in source and target regimes of the fact of interaction and also preparedness to respond to it.
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Stokke, Olav Schram ; Coffey, Clare |
Published in: |
Marine Policy. - Elsevier, ISSN 0308-597X. - Vol. 28.2004, 2, p. 117-126
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | EU common fisheries policy Fisheries management Fisheries research International council for the exploration of the sea Institutional interplay International regimes |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Precaution, ICES and the common fisheries policy: a study of regime interplay
Stokke, Olav Schram, (2004)
-
Environmental policy integration in Europe
Coffey, Clare, (2005)
-
Environmental policy integration in Europe
Coffey, Clare, (2005)
- More ...