Precluding collusion in the Vickrey auction

Olga Gorelkina

This paper studies collusion in one-shot auctions, where a buyer can bribe his competitors into lowering their bids. We modify the single-unit Vickrey auction to incite deviations from the designated-winner scenario and thus undermine collusion. The construction of mechanism does not require the knowledge of colluders ́identities or distributions of valuations, in which sense it is entirely detail-free.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Gorelkina, Olga
Publisher:	Bonn : Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods
Subject:	Bidder collusion \| detail-free auctions \| Vickrey auction

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (38 S.)
Series:	Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. - Bonn : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2172002-2. - Vol. 2014/10
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	German
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/102663 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395148