Preemptible queues with advance reservations : strategic behavior and revenue management
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Chamberlain, Jonathan ; Simhon, Eran ; Starobinski, David |
Published in: |
European journal of operational research : EJOR. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217, ZDB-ID 243003-4. - Vol. 293.2021, 2 (1.9.), p. 561-578
|
Subject: | Game theory | Queuing | Revenue management | Revenue-Management | Spieltheorie | Warteschlangentheorie | Queueing theory |
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